

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

19 March 1981

Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Room 1D517, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301


Dear Mr. Kinney:

In accordance with a request from the OSD Records Administrator, dated 27 February 1981, we have reviewed the attached OSI memorandum, RDB-GG-123/1, and have determined that it may be declassified.

We have noted the declassification action on the memorandum and are returning it to you. If we can be of further assistance, please call on us.

Sincerely,

JCS review completed


Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

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OSD review completed

Attachment:
OSI Memo, RDB-GG-123/1

ENCLOSURE CONTAINS RESTRICTED DATA

~~TOP SECRET~~

Louis J. Hazel
Declassification and Archival Branch
Joint Secretariat
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
23941, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301

13 MAR 1981

Dear Mr. Hazel:

Your letter of 19 December 1980 to [redacted] was referred to my office for action. [redacted] division is responsible for the 20-year systematic review of records, but E.O. 12065 mandatory review requests, such as Mr. Rosenberg's, are processed by my staff.

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The enclosed document, the so-called Hickey Report, has been reviewed by the appropriate components of this Agency. In their judgment, the document must retain its classification and the release of segregable portions is not feasible. Subsections 1-301(a), (c), (e) & (g) apply. The unauthorized disclosure of the document reasonably could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security. Accordingly, we recommend that Mr. Rosenberg's request be denied in its entirety.

If it is our responsibility to defend the above determination in the event of an administrative Appeal, Mr. Rosenberg should be apprised of the procedure. To appeal, he must write to the CIA Information Review Committee, in my care, explaining in as much detail as possible the basis for challenging our actions.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

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Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure EBD/NOT

1 - EBD/NOT

1 - EBD 881-0038 DIA (S) (C) (S) (X)

1 - EBD 881-0038

NOTE - VICE MEXICO

DISSEMINATION: ENCLOSURE CONTAINS RESTRICTED DATA

ENCLOSURE IS NOT TO BE

UNCLASSIFIED When Separated

~~TOP SECRET~~

IPD/CES/cb 12 March 81
Distribution:

Orig - Adse w/encl.

- 1 - IPD Chrono
- 1 - IPD E81-0036 DIF (a), (c), (e), (g)
- 1 - NFAC/FOIO
- ✓ 1 - CRD/OIS

106-250851

SUBJ: DOD Request To Declassify D/OSI letter of 31 August 1951.

From [redacted]

I have ~~received~~^{examined} the OSI letter which the DOD on 27 February 1981 requested we review, and feel that it could now be declassified. The order of battle information which the Director of OSI said was probably true is 33 years old and came from open sources. The only missile information stated concerns German World War II V series — hardly classifiable at this time. If you wish to have the S&T Branch missile experts give you a second opinion, feel free to do so, but I suspect they will concur in its release too. [redacted]

Agree with the above. The ^{current} state of the art in missile and submarine type warfare would tend to substantiate this information. This is not to say that [redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 FEB 1981

Info
545-6700
195-5353
Lowry

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review

During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) documents over 20 years old, the Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned up the attached document(s).

The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise of interest to you.

It is therefore requested that your agency review the documents and recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies.

The time permitted by Executive Order 12065 to reach the point where all OSD documents over 20 years old have been reviewed, and the large volume of over 20 year old OSD documents, make it necessary to request your response within 60 days. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to have referred to you in the future.

Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Headquarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon completion of your review.

Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

E. E. Lowry, Jr.
E. E. Lowry, Jr.
OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (1)
- Memo, dtd 31 Aug 51, Log #329-51, Cy #87
(4 pgs)(S)

695-5154
Kinney

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 ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Washington 25, D. C.

LOG NO. 329-51

COPY NO. 87

31 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, PLANNING DIVISION, RDB
 ATTENTION: Mr. Charles S. Weaver

SUBJECT: Translation from "Polarforschung"

Reference: Memorandum dated 10 May 1951 from
 H. E. Landsberg to Chief, Intelligence
 Branch, RDB

DOCUMENT NO.
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS
 DECLASSIFIED
 CLASS CHANGED TO 18 8 8
 NEXT REVIEW DATE
 DATE 5/17/81

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1. At your request, OSI has evaluated the translation from "Polar Research" and found it to be inaccurate and somewhat unsatisfactory as a serious scientific contribution. However, it should be noted that three additional reports which we have located substantially duplicate much of the material contained in the subject translation.

a. One item on Soviet training for winter warfare quotes from Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm) for 30 January, 1950, p.6, as follows:

"The Russian emigre paper Chasovoy states that for the past year the military authorities have been carrying out comprehensive experiments with three specially-equipped 'winter armies,' stationed in North Siberia. The 1st Army, consisting of 8 Divisions, has its headquarters at Murmansk and is being trained with a view to winter operations in northern-most Sweden and Norway, and in Iceland and Greenland. The 2nd Army is at Igarka, on the River Yenisei, and is being trained for airborne landings in Northern Canada. The 3rd Army staff is stationed at Magdagan, and is training for the invasion of the Aleutians and Alaska. . . On the Chukotsk Peninsula, bases have been set up for radio-controlled rocket weapons of the V-5 and V-6 type, intended for other bombardment of Chicago, Detroit, and other North American industrial centers. Last winter (1948/49) extensive maneuvers with the three armies were staged north of the Arctic Circle. It is reported that the results were negative. Supply services did

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not function in the intense cold, and a large percentage of the personnel perished from hunger and cold. This winter (1949/50) exercises are again being carried out north of the Arctic Circle with smaller formations than previously."

b. Another item on Soviet winter warfare reads:

"The Soviets have three special polar armies with a total of twenty-five divisions. The headquarters of the Western Polar Army was in Murmansk and its eight divisions were preparing to conduct operations in Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Greenland. The Siberian Polar Army, with headquarters at Igarka on the river Yenisei, was destined to launch an airborne attack against Canada. The Far Eastern Polar Army at Magadan was to invade Alaska and the Aleutians. Bases for radio-directed rocket missiles V-5 and V-6 for bombing industrial centers in the U. S. A. were being constructed on the Chukotsk Peninsula. In the autumns of 1948 and 1949 several divisions held maneuvers to the north of the Arctic Circle to try out special arms and equipment. The first experiments were most unsuccessful - The supply service breaking down completely."

c. The third item quotes from Il Messaggero Veneto (Udine) for 12 August 1950 as follows:

"... By 1948, 3 polar armies with 25 divisions had been formed in the Arctic: (i) Western Polar Army, H.Q. Murmansk, with 8 divisions; to attack Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Greenland; Siberian Polar Army, H.Q. Igarka, with 8 divisions, for airborne invasion of Northern Canada; Third Far Eastern Army, H.Q. Magadan, with 9 divisions, to occupy Alaska and the Aleutians. . . Installations for launching radio-guided V-5 and V-6 rockets with a range of up to 300 miles are under construction on the Chukotsk Peninsula. There are also submarine pens on the cliff coast of the Peninsula. Soviet Arctic maneuvers in 1948 resulted in 50% casualties."

2. It will be noted that these three reports are not only much like each other but also that they closely paralleled the subject translation, which in its original form was dated 1950. It is possible either that (a) the German book first appeared, was copied in the emigre paper and quoted in the Stockholm and in the Udine papers, and that the other informant relied on one of these; or (b) each of these four sources is dependent on a common sub-source; or (c) each of the four reports was created independently. The close similarity of the four reports tends to eliminate "c" as a real possibility. It is impossible to determine whether "a" or "b" most clearly represents the case. In any event, the information contained

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in the subject report can be evaluated as PROBABLY TRUE insofar as the first fourteen sentences are concerned. (See "Intelligence Review," #179, April 1951, D/A, ACS-G-2, pp. 51-61, for a general appreciation of "The Soviets' Doctrine and Practice of Winter Warfare.")

3. Insofar as the information concerning guided missiles and special type arctic submarines is concerned, the following evaluations are presented:

a. Guided Missiles—The sentence of the translation pertaining to the construction of "launching sites for radio-directed rocket missiles of the type 'V-5' and 'V-6', which have a range of 5000 kilometers," is evaluated PROBABLY FALSE. It is not believed that the Soviets will have the capability of producing a guided missile with a range of 5000 kilometers (3100 miles) for several years; therefore, operational deployment of such missiles on the Chukotsk Peninsula at this early date is out of the question. There is no known Soviet guided missile bearing the designation "V5" or "V6". The German guided missile program, which was taken over by the Soviets as their own program, used the "V" series to designate different models of certain missiles; i.e., the HS-293 series included V-1, V-2, V-3, V-4, V-5, V-6, V-7, V-8, CV-1, CV-2, HV-1, HV-2, etc. It is remotely possible that the "V5" and "V6" reported in this translation could be models of a USSR missile series; but, to date there is no known Soviet development which could give the range reported. There remains the possibility that rockets with less than optimum strategic range for attack against the continental U.S. are based on the Chukotsk Peninsula; previous reports of questionable credibility have indicated such activity as far back as 1945. The airfields in this region may be for conventional bombers. In an all-out war against the United States the Soviets may be expected to launch an air attack from the Chukotsk Peninsula since the Hanford atomic energy installations are within a round-trip range of existing Soviet bombers capable of carrying an atomic bomb.

b. Special type arctic submarines—It is doubtful if an all-year submarine base exists in this area because of winter port ice conditions. There is no information which would indicate that the Soviets have a "special type arctic submarine." There is no reason for the development of a "special type" submarine for this area unless by "special type" is meant the use of special fittings on a conventional submarine, such as steel propellers, periscope shears protectors, external vent heating coils, anti-fog periscope devices, and hull ice protectors, or reinforcements.

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4. Conclusions

a. The subject translation is one of a series of similar reports from various sources. The close similarity suggests that either a common sub-source exists for all these reports or that they were built up chronologically from the first.

b. The bulk of the subject translation, concerning equipment tested and results experienced, can be evaluated as probably true, in the light of present knowledge.

c. The remainder of the subject translation, concerning guided missile and submarine developments, can be evaluated as probably false.

/s/ H. M. Chadwell

H. MARSHALL CHADWELL

Assistant Director, OSI

Attachment: Item translated
from "Polarforschung"

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RDB-GG 123/1